




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ANALYSIS

—♦—OF—♦—

CALDERWOOD'S HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

*Alfred
Gandy*
A. G. REEVES, '84.

REVISED AND ADAPTED TO THE '88 EDITION.



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ANALYSIS
—OF—
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Handbook of Moral Philosophy.

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PART I.

(The object of Part I. is to prove that our knowledge of moral distinctions, moral judgements, first principles of morals, sense of duty or obligation (oughtness) and of moral right and wrong are *intuitive*; and that conscience is a primitive faculty irresolvable into simpler elements.)

CHAPTER I.

Knowledge of Moral Distinctions.

There is in consciousness (the first act of mind) a knowledge of moral distinctions. This appears, I.—In the division of actions into right and wrong, and as morally good and morally bad. *Good* is a character of things, *right* is a quality of actions. The ancients fell into error by founding moral science on the former alone. This has led to Utilitarianism on the one side and confusion on the other. The terms right and wrong are applicable only to *personal* actions, the actions of animals or inanimate objects having no moral quality. There are three elements involved in every action possessing moral quality,—motive, act, and end or purpose. All personal actions are moral (moral as here used means either good or bad, that is, having moral quality). Thus actions purely physical or intellectual may not be moral; but these may acquire moral quality by being involved with actions of our moral nature. For example, there may be no morality in striking a sand-bag with my fist: but if I substitute a human eye for the sand-bag, my action at once obtains moral quality. Therefore, a division of actions into good, bad, and indifferent is inadmissible. Actions are either, 1st Right, 2nd Wrong, or 3rd Those having in themselves no moral attributes, but capable of

having moral character impressed upon them. II.—That moral distinctions are in consciousness and therefore recognised by men generally, may be shown by reference to the testimony, 1st From individual conduct. Every one recognizes his own actions as right or wrong. 2nd From social life. Society approves right actions, and punishes wrong.

CHAPTER II.

Moral Judgments.

The knowledge here to be explained involves a relation between me and mine, and between me and others, and presupposes the existence of a cognitive power belonging to my personality. Knowledge of matters of fact takes three forms, 1st Sensation. 2nd Perception. 3rd Judgment. Since *affections* and *sensations* presuppose one or more of these forms of knowledge, and since *association* merely provides for their combination, neither the sensational nor the associational theory can afford any valid explanation of the origin of our knowledge of moral distinctions. Of the sensational theorists, Jonathan Edwards made the standard of morality, *benevolence*; David Hume derived it from *reason* and *sentiment*; Adam Smith made the foundation of morality *sympathy*, fellow-feeling; and Dr. Thomas Brown founded it upon the *emotions*.

The knowledge of moral quality in an action is not of the nature of *sensation*, since this is simply an involuntary experience consequent on personal relations to a sensitive organism. Nor is it of the nature of *perception*, since this is a simple recognition of fact, and can include only such facts as are capable of being known without comparison or inference. Perception can give knowledge of an action, but not of its moral quality. Knowledge of moral quality is of the nature of a *judgment*. It can be obtained only by *comparison*. This comparison is not of individual objects or actions, but of a particular act with a general truth. These judgments are distinguished, not by their moral quality as right or wrong, but by their intellectual quality as true or false. In other kinds of judgment the standard may be variable, but in these it is immutable. Therefore, every valid moral judgment must carry in it a general truth. Thus the syllogism will be—

All lies are wrong,

This statement is a lie.

∴ This statement is wrong.

Here the concluding judgment carries in it the general major premise,—all lies are wrong.

CHAPTER III.

First Principles of Morals.

The general principles involved in moral judgments are such that they cannot be rationally contradicted. They are self-evident, intuitive. Induction can not give them, but can only guide to the fact that they are discovered in consciousness. For example, the principle which decides the rightfulness of acquisition is,—“It is right for man to use his powers for rational ends.” This is the outcome of personality and the necessary condition of a self-directed life. It is intuitive, and not inductive. From it follow these principles,—“Industry is right; acquisition of property by use of property is right, etc., and, since the right implies the wrong, such counter principles as—“Idleness is wrong; waste of property is wrong,” etc. By generalizing the above principles in the spheres of exchange, use of our powers, etc., we arrive at the general judgments—“Honesty is right; justice, industry, truthfulness, temperance, etc., are right.”

These are *necessary* truths (recognized by reason), as distinguished from *contingent* truths or those recognized by observation. Both are always true, but the distinction is in the *mode of recognition*. The general principles in moral judgments are present by implication, not by personal experience. The power to recognize them is named *reason* in contradistinction to reasoning or understanding. They are laws of conduct. First principles of morals do not contradict each other; but there is sometimes apparent contradiction in their application. Ex.—Lying to a murderer to save a friend's life.

The recognition of moral truth is the function of what Kant calls the practical reason, as distinguished from the pure or speculative reason. The former means about the same as conscience.

CHAPTER IV.

Conscience.

“Conscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual for the guidance of his conduct. It is

strictly a cognitive power only. (Here Calderwood differs from other intuitionists, who regard conscience as both a cognitive and emotional faculty. See "Intuitions of the Mind," or junior year psychology.) Conscience has sovereign and absolute authority over all springs of activity within us. The honor of establishing this belongs to Bishop Butler, who called it the moral approving and disapproving faculty. This supreme authority rests not on the character of conscience itself, but on that of the truth which it discovers.

Conscience can not be educated, because its sole office is to discover primitive truth. (This comes from viewing it as merely a *cognitive* power. It will not hold if we regard conscience as possessing an emotional element.) Our dispositions, affections and desires are in harmony with our nature, only when subordinate to conscience.

Conscience authoritatively requires the suppression of moral evil within us. In its popular sense it has a much wider meaning than that given above, being made to embrace all our moral decisions. And in this sense only can we speak of a tender, hardened, blunted, etc., conscience.

If conscience is intuitive, how can there be diversity of moral judgments among men? In regard to this question notice,—1st That men differ, not as to what is right, but chiefly as to what is wrong. 2nd That men differ, not as to the principles, but only as to their application.

I. Ethical explications. 1st Dispositions in our nature, out of harmony with conscience, are impelling us to action. 2nd The difficulty arises only in the application of principles to circumstances, not in the principles themselves.

II. Psychological explanations, based on the following laws of mind: 1st Dispositions have power to sway the judgment. What a man desires to do, that he is ready to believe to be right. 2nd Prevailing opinions are often accepted without investigation. 3rd Moral sentiments cluster around a false judgment as readily as around a true.

CHAPTER V.

Duty or Obligation.

Oughtness is a "judgment, affirming present personal subjection to clearly recognized moral law." The judgment of oughtness

applies to the agent, that of right to the action. Each of these implies the other.

Moral obligation is always *complete*, never *partial*. But there is a distinction made between perfect and imperfect obligation, in three uses—*Ethical* use—1st Perfect duties are those which are always binding. 2nd Imperfect, those which are binding only under certain circumstances. —*Judicial* use—1st Perfect, those that can be enforced under sanction of positive law. 2nd Imperfect, those which cannot be thus enforced.

Transcendental use. 1st All duties are primarily imperfect. 2nd Only those which *are actually* enforced by positive law are perfect, (not those which can be enforced but those which actually *are*.) There are three forms of necessity for man,—Physical, Intellectual and Moral. Oughtness is *moral* necessity.

From personal obligation follow logically, moral responsibility and accountableness to God.

CHAPTER VI.

Moral Rights.

Oughtness implies the *right* of the moral being to act as duty requires. It also implies rights on the part of others, which that moral being is bound to respect. It is the old principle of jurisprudence, that every right implies a corresponding duty and *vice versa*. Rights are either 1st Common—belonging alike to all; or 2nd Special—due to some because of their special relation to others.

All *moral* rights are perfect rights. Rights are again divided into 1st Natural—those belonging by nature. 2nd Acquired by circumstances, as those arising out of contracts. The latter rest ultimately for their authority upon the former.

EVOLUTION THEORIES.

DIVISION I.

Origin of Knowledge.

(The fundamental position of this theory is that, "All our most complex states of consciousness are merely developments, under natural law, from our simplest state." The object of the present division is to refute the conclusions, which flow from this position, regarding the leading points discussed in Part I.)

The development theory is first of all a theory of mind. It holds that mind in its present state, is the general resultant of all previous experiences. This is sometimes also called the sensational theory, because it begins with sensation as the simplest act of consciousness. Four questions arise regarding sensation, as that of smell. 1. What is sensation?—a point of consciousness. 2. How does it arise?—By odorous particles striking the nerves of smell and being transmitted to the nerve centers in the brain. 3. Where does the sensation exist? In *me*, as distinguished from my organs of smell. 4. How is the sensation known? It is known as a *fact*, in my own experience. It is, says the sensationist, the primordial element of knowledge. How this sensation is awakened in consciousness is yet unknown. Now this sensation, thus defined, is different from consciousness. There is consciousness involved in every sensation, but they are distinct. In consciousness there is both knowledge of *self* and knowledge of the present experience. These last statements are in opposition to James Mill, who holds that sensation and consciousness are identical. This is also held, but more cautiously, by J. S. Mill and Prof. Bain.

In proof of his doctrine, J. S. Mill supposes a being, possessed of sensation but having no memory. "Such a being," says he, "could have no notion of self because that is a consequence of memory." Here he confuses *notion* with knowledge. Such a being, it is true, could have no *notion* of self, of personal identity; but he would have *knowledge* of self in every act of sensation. There must be a *feeler* before a *felt*. You can not have a knowledge of one apart from the other. I have a knowledge of the sensation and, at the same time, a knowledge of self, as experiencing the sensation. The two are separate. Prof. Bain draws a distinction between feeling and knowledge of that feeling; but says the former may be accompanied by a *minimum* of the latter, or as good as none at all. But if there be even a *minimum* of consciousness, as distinct from sensation, you cannot build mind out of sensation. This, then, is the first great fact which the development theory fails to explain, *i. e.*, *self-consciousness*.

It fails in the second place to explain the series or flow of our experiences. It should explain 1. The fact of a connected series of experiences. 2. The diversity of nature in the successive parts of the series.

In regard to 1. such a series cannot be conscious of its own unity. There must be something to connect them, and that is memory, as to the past and expectation as to the future. If these powers be attributed to the series of sensations, the theory is self-contradicting : if they be original faculties, then mind can not be made from sensation alone, and the sensational theory fails. In regard to 2. it is equally true that such faculties as affections, emotions, desires, &c., can no more be formed from mere sensation than memory and expectation. The final resort of the development theory is to the laws of associations. (See Mills 4 Laws—Similarity, Contiguity, Repetition and Tenacity or Persistence : p. 106.)

These laws simply provide for connecting the facts which pass through consciousness. If there be in consciousness nothing but feelings and provision for their association, the result can be nothing but a combination of feelings.

Feelings may afford matter for thought, but cannot, of themselves, produce thoughts, emotions, &c.

Knowledge of Moral Distinctions.

SEC. 5. This sec. shows that the development theory cannot distinguish between right and wrong in action. "Actions, which produce happiness," says Mill, are right ; those tending to produce the reverse are wrong. This is Utilitarianism.

The rise of pleasure is the natural accompaniment of our sensation or of the exercise of our energies. Pain springs either from injury to the sensitive organs or from restraint upon their energies. But neither of these is the *end* of the use of our energies.

Pleasures are of various kinds, from the lowest animal pleasures to the highest intellectual. But it does not follow, because actions are pleasurable or painful, that they are therefore good or bad.

Actions, which affect others, may likewise be classified according as they produce happiness. This is the classification of the universalistic utilitarians. Moral good is that which produces happiness ; moral evil is that which produces misery—this is the central doctrine of utilitarianism. Some of the theories under it are as follows :—*Hobbs* makes the standard *personal happiness*. *Paley* adds the element of *benevolence*. "Virtue is doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God." *Jeremy Bentham* and *J. S. Mill* make the standard the greatest good of the great-

est numbers.

A criticism of utilitarianism implies a criticism 1, of its theory of life, and 2, of its theory of morals. As to 1, utilitarianism cannot distinguish between *kinds* of happiness; and \therefore lowers human beings to the level of swine. But we know that there are different *kinds* of happiness. Again, the end of our being is the use of all our faculties for the accomplishment of rational ends. These rational ends are not simply pleasure, but 1, as to ourselves, the development of all our energies 2, as to others, the development and performance of their life work, and 3, as to God, devotion to him, as the source of our being and the ruler of our destiny. Again, as to 2. Happiness is a broader term than morality. All morally right actions are agreeable; but not all agreeable actions are morally right. So not all actions, producing pain, are morally wrong. Some pain, even, must be endured for the sake of happiness. Ex. A surgical operation.

The Utilitarian says happiness is the sole end of morality, but, when asked what kind of happiness, he replies: "Such as we *ought* to seek." He must assume *ought* or deny that there is quality in happiness. This holds equal against Utilitarianism, whether egoistic or universalistic.

Conscience.

SEC. 13. The Utilitarian, since he considers right as a tendency to produce happiness, has no need of conscience as a power of moral recognition. He calls it the moral sense. Bain calls it "An imitation within us of the government without us." This could give a sense of avoidance, but could never produce the feeling of oughtness. Schopenhauer manufactures conscience from 5 elements, fear of man, superstition, prejudice, vanity and custom. This simply presents a number of unworthy motives for action, and likewise fails to account for oughtness.

There is a standard of right and wrong, independent of ourselves, which these philosophers practically assume, but for which they fail to account.

Duty or Obligation.

SEC. 15. Utilitarianism furnishes no warrant for the doctrine of personal obligation. The pleasurable can only *attract*, but duty is imperative. This difficulty has led to diversity of opinion

on this point, among Utilitarians. Bentham simply denies the existence of oughtness. "The word *ought*, *ought* not to be in the English language." Bain makes external authority the source of personal obligation. Mr. Mill finds the source of obligation in personal feelings. "The internal sensation of duty," says he, "is a feeling in our own mind: a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty." This statement presupposes a doctrine of duty (to be violated), but does not supply it.

Besides, to one who should say he has no desire for the happiness of himself or others, this theory has no answer, since it can not say to him, "You ought," independently of the idea of happiness.

The doctrine of the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers is admissible for its benevolence; but in order to be accepted as sound, it should furnish an unvarying *obligation* to act benevolently. This it does not do.

DIVISION II.

Dialectic Evolution.

Dialectic Evolution is equivalent to Logical Evolution, as founded by Hegel. This system presupposes 1st, *existence*, in order that there may be a philosophy of it; and 2nd, *personal existence*, as distinct from existence external to itself,—from nature, as apart from the thinker; 3rd, *experience in consciousness*, as affording knowledge of both; and 4th, the *conditions of thought* given in the nature of our intelligence. These are the data of the theory.

Transcending even Psychological Evolution, Dialectic Evolution contemplates existence as a whole, finding the Philosophy of being in an evolution of existence, whose Predetermined order is held to be according to the logical relations of the general notions named Categories. Hegelianism claims to be the true philosophy.

Hegel's theory.—The Categories which underlie all thought are held to underlie all being. His philosophy is the orderly unfolding of these Categories, this theory fails in not making the distinction between relative and Absolute Intelligence.

The Logic of the Categories is the orderly progression of thought from Being as the most general, up through Quality, Quantity, and Relation, including all aspects of differentiation

which the concrete supplies. In this line of progress we find 1st, a doctrine of Being, 2nd, a doctrine of Essence, or essential being, and 3rd, we reach the Absolute Spirit.

Dialectic Evolution escapes the difficulty of attempting to account for higher orders by reference to preexisting *lower* orders of being. But it encounters an insurmountable difficulty when it refers all, that is commonly attributed to man, to the agency of the Absolute One.

Duty:—How can Dialectic Evolution account for “the moral consciousness,” which commands to act in given directions, and to shun acting in opposite direction? This theory starts in the same place in which the Utilitarians begin, with feeling and desire, with the testimony of individual experience. It then tries to find some transition from the agreeable to the dutiful. They claim that the intelligent agent desires, not an outside thing, but self-satisfaction: self-realization. But is self-satisfaction equivalent to duty? (This scheme leaves out irrational desires and therefore fails to cover the whole ground). Self-realization is the ethical end of Hegelianism. The fallacy will appear if the proper place be assigned to ETHICAL LAW. Morality is a universal: and implies both something to be done, and the doing of it by me. Morality regards Desire as impulse, and rejects it as the standard. Self-realization is to be reached by following the voice of Morality, and not Morality by an attempt at self-realization.

Conscience:—Dialectic Evolution makes very slight reference to Conscience. Evolution of the notion has no place for Conscience in its ordinary acceptance.

PART II.

Impulses and Restraints Natural to Man.

CHAPTER I.

Impulses to Action.

These impulses within us have been called principles of action, motives, active powers and springs of action. The word *principle* is here used to denote the origin of knowledge. The word—motive—is ambiguous, being applied to external as well as internal forces.

Some impulses belong to our physical nature and are common

to us with the lower animals. They are called appetites, as hunger, thirst, sex, &c. Impulses are divided into 1, Desires, 2, Affections, and 3, Judgments.

1. *Desire* is a craving, and involves 3 things (a) consciousness of want, (b) consequent restlessness of the nature, (c) a longing for satisfaction.

Mental desires are continuous in action, and depend upon intelligence for their exercise. They are such as desire of knowledge, of society, of esteem, of power.

2. *Affection* is inclination towards others, disposing us to give what may influence them for good or evil. They take the form of love or hate, of remorse or piety.

3. *Judgments* of two distinct classes take rank (a) as judgments of prudence, concerned with expediency, and (b) judgments of rectitude, connected with rightness in actions and dispositions. These judgments have connected with them certain dispositions whose impelling force operates with the judgments. Such are self-love, hope, devotion to the deity, &c. These impelling forces are original powers of our nature which cannot be accounted for on any theory of development.

Desires may be mere natural forces, in origin possessed of no moral quality, but in their continuance, since this depends on the will, they acquire moral characteristics. So a judgment, regarded merely as a proposition, may have no moral quality; but when accepted as an impulse to action, it comes under the domain of moral law. All other impulses are morally subordinate to moral judgments, which alone have title to sway the conduct. Among the subordinate natural impulses, affections occupy a position superior to desires, when both are regarded from a moral point of view.

CHAPTER II.

Restraints upon Action.

That there must be restraint upon some of our actions is shown by the diversity of nature of our natural *impulses*, as love, hate, &c. *Emotions* also restrain us, such as wonder, grief, fear, &c. Emotions are agitation of feelings, and always imply a sense of weakness. At their height, they attain to an overwhelming force, paralyzing the other energies. They are, in this sense, in-

dependent of the will, and in their exercise, may reach a paroxysm, ungovernable by the will. They are also fitted to amalgamate with impulses, and, while restraining in one direction, to quicken action in the other.

PART III.

THE WILL.

Its Nature and Relation to our other Powers.

Will is the power of control over our other faculties, by means of which we are enabled to determine personal activity. Notice—Will is control of *our own* powers, not of *external things*. It is distinct from all the other powers. It is the controlling power of our nature. Desire is craving for what we have not; will is use of what belongs to us, as part of our own nature. Will holds a double relation to intelligence. 1. One of *superiority*, in respect of control, 2. one of *inferiority*, in respect of need for guidance in governing the subordinate powers. Reason is the legislator and governor of will. To all other powers, lower than intelligence, will holds simply the relation of control. Will stands between the higher and lower powers, to enable the former to control the latter.

SEC. 5. *Exercise of the Will.*

An act of will is a volition. Volition may be of different degrees. 1. Mere assent. 2. Deliberate determination of the will. There are also forms of action, provided for by our nature, independently of choice or volition, as there are others which can be originated only by personal choice. Volition may thus originate activity or control activity which it does not originate. Rational self-control is adequate self-control of all personal activity by the will.

SEC. 9. *Freedom of Will.*

This is exclusively a question of psychology. This appears chiefly by reference to the powers which will regulates, as intellect, impulse, &c. ∴ It is properly a question as to the powers of the mind. One prominent aspect therefore is, has the will controlling influence over the other powers, or have the other powers controlling influence over the will? Another aspect is the inquiry concerning the essential nature of the will. The first question to be considered is, do volitions determine motives, or motives de-

termine volitions? And this requires us to draw a distinct line between the two. Motive is an internal force, which impels to action; while will is the power of determining whether to act or not to act. The latter must therefore *choose*, before the former can lead to action.

Motives may be divided in two general classes: 1, Dispositions, and 2, Judgments. Each of these, influences will in a different way. Human choice, it is true, is affected by such stimuli as the dispositions, but it is not determined by them. We choose *among* our dispositions. This choice is ruled by reason. It is the old rule, that reason governs the passions. This has also, in personal experience, control over the higher motives or judgments. We are *conscious of personal volition*, whenever we use our intellect, and as long as the process continues, we are conscious that volition is free.

Freedom of will is a control over the whole, by reason of the control which we have over reason or understanding. The power of *attention* gives us the power to restrain or follow motives.

The next question is, how does will control itself? This is a difficult question and leads us into the region of mere hypothesis, for we use the power of will, without knowing how we bring it into use. There are three theories as to this action of will: 1, that it is constrained, 2, spontaneous action, 3, free action.

Theory 1, is invalidated, because of its inconsistency with the recognized facts of consciousness. The same objection holds against 2, which would make our action perfectly uniform; and we *know* that it is not uniform. Therefore 3, it is the only theory which harmonizes with the fact of consciousness. But we have not a *complete* consciousness of the action of will, and because of this we are unable to complete a philosophy of will. This is not singular, for we see many analogies to it, in the history of mind. The leading points in the free will argument may be stated thus: We never act, except upon motive, and upon the strongest motive at the time of acting. If this were all, it would be plain that the will is subordinate to the strongest motive and hence is not free. But there is another element to be taken into account—reason. By our reason we can *delay* choice, and thus enable a weaker motive to obtain strength and finally to become the strongest and determine action. This process is called *delibera-*

tion and it is this that makes the will free. But it is to be carefully noted that this is not a lawless freedom, but a freedom, in accordance with the laws of reason.

SEC. 10. *Necessitarianism*.—This doctrine is that man is free to act as he chooses, but is not free to choose as he chooses. Mill prefers to call the doctrine determinism. This is a poor word, since the real distinction between the two doctrines is between self-determination and motive determination. The argument for necessitarianism, on its negative side (that denying freedom of will) is that, since every effect must have a cause, every act of volition has something back of it to cause it, and therefore is not free. The error here is in the explanation of a mental phenomenon by a physical analogy. There is, in the mental world, an adjustment of forces, which is not found in the natural world, except where man interferes. In this world of mind, we must look to consciousness to help decide; and this declares for freedom. We must distinguish between man's nature and his character. The one is made for him; the other he makes for himself. He does this by restraining his motives by reason.

Again, the necessitarian cannot account for consciousness of moral responsibility and the justice of personal liability to punishment. Necessitarianism also fails to give any adequate philosophy of the moral sentiments, such as shame or remorse. If we are under necessity to act as we do, why should we feel responsibility or shame for such action? There is no answer to this except that we are under no necessity to choose as we do choose to act.

PART IV.

Moral Sentiments.

Besides affections and emotions we have also moral sentiments in our nature, which have for their object moral actions, considered in themselves. These illustrate the fact, that every act of intelligence is accompanied by an act of sensibility. They may be either feelings, affections or emotions. They also appear as pleasurable or painful sensations. These divisions are made in conformity with the judgments on which they attend, for moral sensations always accompany moral judgments.

They take the most definite form when the judgment on which

they depend is concerned with our own conduct. Thus judgment of personal approval is followed by a feeling of self-approbation. The frequent occurrence of these, warrants a favorable judgment as to personal character. The opposite result follows, upon the pursuit of a wrong course of conduct.

Since moral sentiments depend upon previous moral judgment, they are of no value, in deciding the character of actions. This decision is rendered by the judgment itself.

PART V.

Moral Evil and Disorder of Moral Nature.

The preceding facts show that our nature does not work in full harmony with the governing power. The evidences of this are 1, Insubordination of our lower motives, 2, the action of impulses condemned by conscience, 3, experience of moral sentiments, such as can exist only in a disordered nature.

This disorder has been almost universally acknowledged by philosophers, from Socrates to Patton. Its extent is to be computed, by noting the abnormal nature of our affections, desires, &c. It is brought about by the opposition between the powers of our nature—abnormal affections, desires, motives &c., on the one hand and intellect or reason on the other.

If conscience had the *power* to govern as it has the *right*, there would be no such disorder of our moral nature. But it is the lack of power in conscience, that gets things astray.

This discord of our moral nature is not such as to blind us to what is right or wrong and, therefore, does not hinder the construction of a moral philosophy. This is said in opposition to Dr. Wardlaw, who has denied the possibility of a moral philosophy, because of the discord of our moral nature. This moral disorder does not unfit us for obedience to moral law. It simply makes such obedience more difficult. Philosophy has no answer to the question, how this moral disorder originated? The more practical question is, how is this disorder to be escaped and our nature restored? This involves two questions. 1, What are the laws of mind which can successfully combat with our dispositions? 2, How shall this moral victory be made the end or purpose of life? To 1, Philosophy answers, by pointing to the moral law, as the law of life, to the law of attention and to the law of

habit. These are the laws of moral progress. To 2, philosophy has no adequate answer.

METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

Metaphysical Procedure.

The Metaphysic of human thought reaches its highest levels in Ethics. A metaphysical element blends in all exercise of our intelligence. There are two senses, a lower and a higher, in which we use the word Metaphysic. The one is concerned with the exercise of thought itself, the metaphysical in thought; the other with the objects of such thought, transcendent existence. Each is the complement of the other. Philosophy is complete only in their union. A difficulty may be interposed, that the relative in thought can only be concerned with the relative in existence, but "the religious Consciousness" of man is a sufficient rejoinder to this, as it can neither be explained by the relative, nor parted from relations.

We are here emerging on the wide field of speculative thought concerning the Universe as a whole, attempting the unification of our knowledge; seeking to make our conceptions of things more truly in accordance with the reality of existence, and to account for the Universe as a whole. Progress in this direction is so necessary to intelligence that it is hopeless to stay procedure here, as it is illogical to suggest it. The whole department of the Philosophy of Religion, has grown up before our view as a testimony to the need of a Metaphysic of Ethics, bearing witness as it does to the uniform tendency of intelligence, towards an exercise of religious thought. The problem of how the metaphysical finds its place in thought now presents itself.

At the preliminary stages of our reflection the Universe itself becomes the problem,—the Universe as a system of existence physical, intellectual, and moral,—the Universe as it is a complete thing, suggesting the higher problem as to the First Cause,—Existence absolute.

There is nothing within the Universe sufficient to explain itself, for the Universe as a whole is not a self-sufficient entity. We widen the range of thought in seeking for a Cause of the Universe—which, if it be a Cause of all finite existence, and thus First Cause, must be self-sufficient—an Eternal Existence.

The solution of the problem must be found in transcendent being. If the Universe is inadequate to account for its own existence, its explanation must lie beyond itself.

Here we are transcending the *sensory*. To the metaphysician it can be in no sense disturbing that the object of search cannot be an object of sense. He who objects to procedure on these terms, ignores the problem; he who seeks to advance, trusts to intelligence as having a deeper power than has been represented by observation and induction.

CHAPTER II.

The First Cause.

The conditions of intelligence imply recognition of a First Cause. Metaphysic is not separated from the common demands of conscious life, but is committed to a philosophic interpretation of the exercise of intellectual power according to the necessary course of its procedure. Nature and the First Cause are indissolubly united in the problem of existence, and the philosophic question largely concerns the action of intelligence as it connects these two. Further, the intellectual activity which raises the problem must be in some way competent for its solution.

Nature is to every intelligence a problem. Known existence invariably raises the inquiry how we can account for it; and such rational procedure, when concerned with the Universe as a whole, implies in the very question raised, not only that the explanation lies beyond the thing to be explained, which holds true in every case but that the source of the Universe is the Self-existent. To bring out the full meaning of this will be to solve the problem. All intelligence moves towards the Absolute or Self-existent.

The only possible result of exercise of our rational nature as to the problem of the Cosmos is acknowledgment of a Self-existent source of all finite being.

Knowledge of the effect is by necessity in some measure knowledge of the Cause. Knowledge of God on the ground of analogy between the Divine nature and human intelligence presupposes knowledge of the attributes of Deity, fitting us to detect analogy, and also to determine where it fails.

CHAPTER III.

Rival Theories as to the Origin of the Universe.

1. *The Materialistic.*—No theory of Existence can assume a

purely negative form. An Atheistic position pure and simple, is, however, impossible. The Universe is a reality, and some account of its source is needful. If we deny that there is a First Cause, we affirm that the Universe has not been caused, and we are assigning to it eternity of existence. But this is merely a hypothesis,—a pure venture, without any warrant, impossible of support on grounds of observation, and with no ground in reason.

No power found in operation can increase or diminish the matter or the energy in the universe. But this does not imply self-sufficiency or self-existence. On the contrary, the fixedness of amount is limitation. That to which the Materialist refers as the source of all, itself requires to have its existence accounted for.

The whole theory is involved in the utmost logical perplexity as an attempted advance from less to greater, without the possibility of satisfying the demands of causality.

2. *The Pantheistic.*—The common aim of the theory is to maintain, not only the unity of the source of finite existence, but absolute and eternal unity of all existence.

The position is taken which denies to Deity any choice in action.

3. *The Polytheistic.*—Assigns distinct personality to different manifestations of Supernatural power.

CHAPTER IV.

Relations of the Moral Governor to the Problems of Moral Life.

1. *The Foundation of Virtue.*—The first of the metaphysical questions peculiar to Ethical science is the source of all morality, or the foundation of Virtue.

There are two alternatives :—Either a theory of the Impersonality of Reason, of which there is no data to warrant such a metaphysical conclusion ; or a theory that Human Reason, while distinct from Divine Intelligence, is a power for recognizing absolute truth, implanted by the Author of our being.

2. The freedom which involves the agent in obligation and responsibility carries continual acknowledgement of the sovereignty of a Divine Ruler.

3. The Origin of Evil may be accounted for in the freedom given by the Deity to His creatures.

4. The destiny of humanity rests with the Author. Immortality, if it be ours, must be the gift of God.

